21 October 2024

This an edited and shortened version of an article that was first published by the Prospect Foundation.

The core of any coalition opposing China in the South China Sea must be the Southeast Asian claimants themselves. They need to recognize that the shared threat they face requires setting aside or shelving internal maritime disputes. Vietnam and the Philippines have made progress in this area, as has Indonesia, despite its official stance that it has no direct boundary dispute with China.

Vietnam has publicly expressed solidarity with the Philippines.

Among the non-claimant ASEAN states, Singapore needs to reassert itself as an impartial advocate for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. When China’s grey zone tactics against the Philippines or other states clearly violate the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct, Singapore and other ASEAN members should not hesitate to speak out, including during the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations between ASEAN and China.

Taiwan also has a critical role, both as a claimant and the occupier of Itu Aba, the largest natural feature in the Spratlys.

With its extensive experience dealing with China’s maritime activities, Taiwan could share its knowledge with Southeast Asian frontline states to help them develop countermeasures against grey zone tactics. While transparency campaigns can generate international support and strengthen moral arguments against China, they do little to deter or modify Beijing’s behavior.

There should be a broader national maritime strategy supported by the military and coordinated with government communications.

Allies should explicitly name China when condemning its grey zone actions in the South China Sea. There are too few statements of solidarity with the Philippines, and those that do exist are often relegated to ambassadors in Manila. Statements from foreign ministers would carry far greater weight.

Non-littoral countries, particularly major maritime states, should clearly assert their national interests in the South China Sea. Recent Japanese and EU support for the Philippines has been helpful, but South Korea needs to be more vocal, given its dependence on shipping routes through the area.

In addition to statements, governments should provide material support if they declare national interests in the region. This could include enhancing Southeast Asian nations’ maritime domain awareness or donating ships and aircraft to help assert presence and deny China control over grey zones.

Governments should also be cautious of Beijing’s bad-faith offers for dialogue on maritime issues, which often aim to neutralize public criticism by creating closed-door forums to privately influence China’s thinking.

Lastly, while operating within the grey zone framework, governments must not shy away from escalatory responses when necessary. When China crosses from grey zone activities into clear military provocations, such as entering uncontested territorial airspace or waters, governments should escalate their reactions accordingly.