Both the PRC, the communist China, and their predecessors, the Kuomintang (ROC), had always maintained that Tibet was a part of China. The PRC also proclaimed an ideological motivation to “liberate” the Tibetans from a theocratic feudal system. In September 1949, shortly before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made it a top priority to incorporate Tibet, Taiwan Island, Hainan Island, and the Penghu Islands into the PRC peacefully or by force. China viewed incorporating Tibet as important to consolidate its frontiers and address national defense concerns in the southwest. Because Tibet was unlikely to voluntarily give up its de facto independence, Mao, in December 1949, ordered that preparations be made to march into Tibet at Qamdo (Chamdo) in order to induce the Tibetan Government to negotiate.The PRC had over a million men under arms and had extensive combat experience from the recently concluded Chinese Civil War.
Negotiations between Tibet and the PRC
Talks between Tibet and China were mediated by the governments of Britain and India. On 7 March 1950, a Tibetan delegation arrived in Kalimpong, India, to open a dialogue with the newly declared People’s Republic of China and to secure assurances that the Chinese would respect Tibetan territorial integrity, among other things. The Tibetan delegation did eventually meet with the PRC’s ambassador, General Yuan Zhongxian, in Delhi on 16 September 1950. Yuan communicated a 3-point proposal that Tibet be regarded as part of China, that China be responsible for Tibet’s defense, and that China be responsible for Tibet’s trade and foreign relations. Acceptance would lead to peaceful Chinese sovereignty or otherwise war. The Tibetans undertook to maintain the relationship between China and Tibet as one of priest-patron:
“Tibet will remain independent as it is at present, and we will continue to have very close ‘priest-patron’ relations with China. Also, there is no need to liberate Tibet from imperialism since there are no British, American or Guomindang imperialists in Tibet, and Tibet is ruled and protected by the Dalai Lama (not any foreign power).”
They and their head delegate, Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, on 19 September, recommended cooperation with some stipulations about implementation. Chinese troops need not be stationed in Tibet. It was argued that Tibet was under no threat and, if attacked by India or Nepal, could appeal to China for military assistance. While Lhasa deliberated, on 7 October 1950, Chinese troops advanced into eastern Tibet, crossing the border at five places.[57] The purpose was not to invade Tibet per se but to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms for a handover of Tibet.On 21 October, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the Communist government and to accept the first provision if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand after a divination before the Six-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the three points could not be accepted since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.
Invasion of Chamdo
After months of failed negotiations, attempts by Tibet to secure foreign support and assistance,PRC and Tibetan troop buildups, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Jinsha River on 6 or 7 October 1950. Two PLA units quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces and captured the border town of Chamdo by 19 October, by which time 114 PLA soldiers and 180 Tibetan soldiers had been killed or wounded. Writing in 1962, Zhang Guohua claimed “over 5,700 enemy men were destroyed” and “more than 3,000” peacefully surrendered. Active hostilities were limited to a border area northeast of the Gyamo Ngul Chu River and east of the 96th meridian. After capturing Chamdo, the PLA broke off hostilities, sent a captured commander, Ngabo, to Lhasa to reiterate terms of negotiation and waited for Tibetan representatives to respond through delegates to Beijing.
PLA marching into Lhasa in October 1951
The PLA sent released prisoners (among them the governor-general of Kham, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme) to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama on the PLA’s behalf. Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was “peacefully liberated”, the Tibetan elites could keep their positions and power.
Tibetan negotiators were sent to Beijing and presented with an already-finished document commonly referred to as the Seventeen Point Agreement. There was no negotiation offered by the Chinese delegation; although the PRC stated it would allow Tibet to reform at its own pace and in its own way, keep internal affairs self-governing and allow religious freedom, it would also have to agree to be part of China. The Tibetan negotiators were not allowed to communicate with their government on this key point and were pressured into signing the agreement on 23 May 1951, despite never having been given permission to sign anything in the name of the government. This was the first time in Tibetan history its government had accepted – albeit unwillingly – China’s position on the two nations’ shared history.
Tibetan representatives in Beijing and the PRC Government signed the Seventeen Point Agreement on 23 May 1951, authorizing the PLA presence and Central People’s Government rule in Political Tibet. The terms of the agreement had not been cleared with the Tibetan Government before signing and the Tibetan Government was divided about whether it was better to accept the document as written or to flee into exile. The Dalai Lama, who by this time had ascended to the throne, chose not to flee into exile and formally accepted the 17 Point Agreement in October 1951. According to Tibetan sources, on 24 October, on behalf of the Dalai Lama, General Zhang Jingwu sent a telegram to Mao Zedong with confirmation of the support of the Agreement, and there is evidence that Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme simply came to Zhang and said that the Tibetan Government agreed to send a telegram on 24 October, instead of the formal Dalai Lama’s approval. Shortly afterwards, the PLA entered Lhasa.The subsequent annexation of Tibet is officially known in the People’s Republic of China as the “Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (Chinese: 和平解放西藏地方 Hépíng jiěfàng xīzàng dìfāng), as promoted by the state media.
In 1956, Tibetan militias in the ethnically Tibetan region of eastern Kham just outside the Tibet Autonomous Region, spurred by PRC government experiments in land reform, started fighting against the government. The militias united to form the Chushi Gangdruk Volunteer Force. When the fighting spread to Lhasa in March 1959, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa on March 17 with an entourage of twenty, including six Cabinet ministers, and fled Tibet.
Both the Dalai Lama and the PRC government in Tibet subsequently repudiated the 17 Point Agreement, and the PRC government in Tibet dissolved the Tibetan Local Government. The legacy of this action continues to the present day.
